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Wieki Gotowości The year 2026 against six centuries of history · Defence Readiness Index

How ready is Poland today (2026)? The Defence Readiness Index: a sober, source-grounded reading of Poland's readiness, measured against six centuries (1410–2026 + a 2030 projection), always relative to the threat and demands of each era. One of the three highest readings in the series on both measures, but not a survival forecast.

Thesis: readiness ≠ survival. This index cannot tell the 1831 and 1920 scores apart, because they differ by less than the uncertainty on either of them. One of those years lost and the other won. Outcomes were decided by alliances, scale and chance, not the bare numbers. This is not a war forecast, we measure preparation, not whether war will break out.

Readiness and aftermath – across the ages

Scale 0–10 (relative to the era's threat). "With allies" is the reading with real allied support, "Without allies" the reading by own forces. "Aftermath" described after the fact (firewalled, does not affect the score).

Every score carries an uncertainty band, and the bands of neighbouring eras overlap heavily. A difference of a few tenths of a point therefore does not mean one era scored better than another: only the extremes of the series are distinguishable. The table is ordered chronologically, not by rank.

YearEraThreatWith alliesWithout alliesOutcomeAftermath / stakes
1410GrunwaldTeutonic Order4.78±1.504.75±1.75mixedlimited – the state survived
1655The DelugeSweden (+ Russia)2.72±1.252.90±1.50mixedheavy – demographic collapse
1683ViennaOttoman Empire5.15±1.254.69±1.25winlimited – the state survived
1792The ConstitutionRussia3.04±1.503.10±1.50lossheavy – loss of autonomy
1794KościuszkoRussia + Prussia2.37±1.502.56±1.50losscatastrophic – loss of statehood – 123 years
1809Duchy of WarsawAustria3.74±1.253.62±1.50winlimited – the state survived
1831November UprisingRussia3.98±1.254.32±1.50lossheavy – loss of autonomy – 87 years
1920Battle of WarsawBolshevik Russia3.73±1.503.96±1.50winlimited – the state survived
1939SeptemberThird Reich (in the variant with the USSR)3.84±1.503.82±1.50losscatastrophic – occupation – 6 years
2026The PresentRussian Federation (+ Belarus)4.96±1.504.40±1.25openopen – the cost has not been borne yet

In brief

1410 · Grunwald
In August 1409 the Teutonic Order declared war on Poland and Lithuania and seized the Dobrzyń Land. The dispute was also over Samogitia, where Grand Duke Witold backed a rising against the Order. In the summer of 1410 Polish and Lithuanian troops entered the Order's state and marched on Malbork. What counts here is mainly the readiness of the army on that campaign, but also the defence of castles and people at home. In our assessment this is the only era in which no dimension falls to the critical threshold. At Grunwald on 15 July the Order's army was routed, but Malbork was not taken. The Peace of Toruń in 1411 brought little, so we judge the outcome mixed. We assess the state of preparation at the moment the army set out for war, so the later victory at Grunwald does not raise that score.
1655 · The Deluge
In 1655 Sweden attacked the Commonwealth while Russia pressed from the east. The state was dreadfully prepared for such a war. In nine of the ten dimensions the score falls to the critical threshold, and there were practically no allies. Within that same year the invaders held most of the country. The Commonwealth survived despite its poor preparation. The country recovered, the Swedes were driven out and the Peace of Oliwa in 1660 ended the war with Sweden. The price was a devastated country and heavy population losses.
1683 · Vienna
In 1683 the Ottoman army was besieging Vienna. Poland marched to the relief far beyond its own borders, as part of a coalition with the Emperor. It had a well-led army and a real ally at its side. On 12 September the forces of John III Sobieski and his allies routed the Ottomans at Vienna. Counting the allies, this is the highest score in the series of eras, although within the uncertainty it cannot be told apart from 1410, 1831 and today. The weakest point is the strategic shield. Fortresses could not withstand Ottoman siege artillery, and Kamieniec Podolski fell in 1672 in about ten days.
1792 · The Constitution
A year after the Constitution of 3 May was adopted, in May 1792, Russia marched into the Commonwealth. Army reform had only just begun and had no time to take effect, and the alliance with Prussia turned out to be empty. In seven of the ten dimensions the score falls to the critical threshold. After about ten weeks the king joined the Targowica Confederation and the war was lost. The Second Partition followed in 1793.
1794 · Kościuszko
In 1794 Tadeusz Kościuszko led an uprising against Russia and Prussia. Almost everything was missing. In all ten dimensions the score sits at the critical threshold, and there were no allies at all. This is the lowest score in the series of eras, although within the uncertainty it cannot be told apart from 1655, 1792, 1920 and 1939. The uprising collapsed after the massacre of Praga in November 1794. A year later the Third Partition erased the state for 123 years.
1809 · Duchy of Warsaw
In April 1809 Austria attacked the Duchy of Warsaw, a small state under Napoleon's protection. Prince Józef Poniatowski's army was not large, and its supply base, economy and finances were weak. After the battle of Raszyn Poniatowski, instead of waiting on the defensive, struck at Austrian Galicia. The war ended in success, as the Peace of Schönbrunn enlarged the Duchy with new lands. A strong patron and a bold decision to attack made the difference.
1831 · November Uprising
The November Uprising broke out in 1830, and early in 1831 Field Marshal Diebitsch's Russian army marched into the Kingdom of Poland. The Kingdom had its own well-trained army, and its economy and roads were in fair shape. The weakest point was allies: nobody came to help from outside, and the enemy was simply much larger. In the autumn of 1831 the uprising collapsed and Russia abolished the Kingdom's autonomy, army and constitution. This era shows that you can lose while being prepared.
1920 · Battle of Warsaw
In 1920 the Red Army was advancing west and in August it stood outside Warsaw. Poland, reborn only two years earlier, had a weak supply base and little help from outside. It did have the asset that stands out most in our assessment: intelligence. Polish codebreakers were reading Soviet radio traffic, so the general staff knew almost every move the enemy made. The Battle of Warsaw saved Polish independence, and the Peace of Riga in 1921 ended the war. Preparation, led by intelligence, modest help from outside and luck all played a part.
1939 · September
On 1 September 1939 Germany attacked Poland, and on 17 September the Soviet Union invaded from the east. Poland had large reserves of manpower and guarantees from France and Britain. Those guarantees did not turn into effective help during the campaign, though. The allies gave Poland no direct military assistance. In the west, France limited itself to a small advance in the Saar area, and the allies relied rather on an economic blockade of Germany. The campaign ended in defeat and occupation. About 5.6–6.0 million citizens of the Second Republic died during the war, including about 3 million Jews, most of them murdered in the Holocaust.
2026 · The Present
Poland is not at war today, but Russia is pressing it without crossing the line of open attack: drones in September 2025, migrants pushed towards the border. In 2023–2024 there was also a series of suspicious damage to cables and a pipeline on the Baltic seabed. The armed forces and the economy score reasonably well. The strongest point is the allies, meaning NATO's Article 5 and American troops in Poland. They raise the score, although the gap between the readings with and without allies lies within the uncertainty. Civil protection is the weakest, meaning shelters, warnings and how prepared civilians are. This story is not over, so its outcome remains open.

Crises without full-scale war

Simplified assessments of responses to specific threats. Comparisons within this group are approximate, so check the threat type. These numbers do not form an annual series of Polish readiness.

Future scenarios

Conditional ranges. Compare scenarios within the same year, checking the assumptions about deliveries, Russia and NATO. Each scenario shows readings with and without allies.

Without allies: Poland’s own capabilities against the threat, with no assumed allied military intervention. Foreign procurement remains in the model. The ranges are a conditional scenario test; they do not include the full uncertainty of the baseline assessment.

2030

In brief. For 2030 we show scenarios, because the future cannot be fairly scored with a single number. The result depends on three things, namely whether the ordered equipment arrives, how fast Russia rebuilds its army, and whether NATO and the US stay engaged. In the worst case readiness falls below today's level and in the best it is slightly above it. Within the uncertainty, though, no scenario breaks away from today's level. That is why a range stands here instead of a single number.

Conditional ranges on a 0–10 scale
ScenarioWith alliesWithout allies
programmes delivered · Russia: baseline reconstitution · NATO/USA stable4.7–6.24.2–5.7
delivery slippage · Russia: baseline reconstitution · NATO/USA stable4.5–6.03.9–5.4
programmes delivered · Russia: baseline reconstitution · NATO/USA weakened4.3–5.84.2–5.7
delivery slippage · Russia: rapid reconstitution · NATO/USA weakened3.3–5.33.0–5.0
programme disruption · Russia: rapid reconstitution · NATO/USA weakened3.1–5.12.8–4.8
Assumptions: programmes delivered · Russia: baseline reconstitution · NATO/USA stable
  • Programmes delivered on schedule (Apache, Wisła II, Miecznik, Krab/K9, Homar-K, K2PL, Narew).
  • Window for rebuilding Russia's army ~2029 (NATO-agreed intelligence; Breuer/Freuding); baseline.
  • NATO/USA stable: The Hague 5% commitment, the force posture review keeps a presence on the eastern flank.
  • The without-allies reading: Poland’s own capabilities against the Russian threat, without allied military intervention. Imports count once delivered and operationally ready; delivery and technology-transfer risks are captured by the programme delivery axis. A change in US presence alone does not change the without-allies reading with the same deliveries and threat. Allied deterrence is excluded from the assessment, so the average runs over the remaining nine dimensions.
Assumptions: delivery slippage · Russia: baseline reconstitution · NATO/USA stable
  • Typical documented slippage (F-35 ~1 year, FA-50PL ~1.5-2 years, Borsuk, scaling up 155 mm ammunition production, Tarcza Wschód slow); the risk that the armed forces cannot keep pace with absorbing deliveries.
  • Window for rebuilding Russia's army ~2029 (NATO-agreed intelligence; Breuer/Freuding); baseline.
  • NATO/USA stable: The Hague 5% commitment, the force posture review keeps a presence on the eastern flank.
  • The without-allies reading: Poland’s own capabilities against the Russian threat, without allied military intervention. Imports count once delivered and operationally ready; delivery and technology-transfer risks are captured by the programme delivery axis. A change in US presence alone does not change the without-allies reading with the same deliveries and threat. Allied deterrence is excluded from the assessment, so the average runs over the remaining nine dimensions.
Assumptions: programmes delivered · Russia: baseline reconstitution · NATO/USA weakened
  • Programmes delivered on schedule (Apache, Wisła II, Miecznik, Krab/K9, Homar-K, K2PL, Narew).
  • Window for rebuilding Russia's army ~2029 (NATO-agreed intelligence; Breuer/Freuding); baseline.
  • Reduction/volatility of the USA on the eastern flank (October 2025 drawdown; Trump announcements; strategic pivot).
  • The without-allies reading: Poland’s own capabilities against the Russian threat, without allied military intervention. Imports count once delivered and operationally ready; delivery and technology-transfer risks are captured by the programme delivery axis. A change in US presence alone does not change the without-allies reading with the same deliveries and threat. Allied deterrence is excluded from the assessment, so the average runs over the remaining nine dimensions.
  • Scope caveat: this is a sensitivity test on the American presence alone, not the full cost of a withdrawal. The materiel channel stays switched on at the baseline level, because programme delivery sits on the on-schedule variant: this scenario assumes Washington reduces its presence but still approves technology transfers and delivers programmes on time. The difference against the stable variant must not be cited as the full cost of a US withdrawal.
Assumptions: delivery slippage · Russia: rapid reconstitution · NATO/USA weakened
  • Typical documented slippage (F-35 ~1 year, FA-50PL ~1.5-2 years, Borsuk, scaling up 155 mm ammunition production, Tarcza Wschód slow); the risk that the armed forces cannot keep pace with absorbing deliveries.
  • Rapid rebuilding of Russia's army after a Ukraine-Russia armistice (Danish/Lithuanian intelligence: 2-5 years regionally).
  • Reduction/volatility of the USA on the eastern flank (October 2025 drawdown; Trump announcements; strategic pivot).
  • The without-allies reading: Poland’s own capabilities against the Russian threat, without allied military intervention. Imports count once delivered and operationally ready; delivery and technology-transfer risks are captured by the programme delivery axis. A change in US presence alone does not change the without-allies reading with the same deliveries and threat. Allied deterrence is excluded from the assessment, so the average runs over the remaining nine dimensions.
Assumptions: programme disruption · Russia: rapid reconstitution · NATO/USA weakened
  • Delivery disruption: absorptive barrier, NIK audits, bottlenecks (Homar-A without US consent).
  • Rapid rebuilding of Russia's army after a Ukraine-Russia armistice (Danish/Lithuanian intelligence: 2-5 years regionally).
  • Reduction/volatility of the USA on the eastern flank (October 2025 drawdown; Trump announcements; strategic pivot).
  • The without-allies reading: Poland’s own capabilities against the Russian threat, without allied military intervention. Imports count once delivered and operationally ready; delivery and technology-transfer risks are captured by the programme delivery axis. A change in US presence alone does not change the without-allies reading with the same deliveries and threat. Allied deterrence is excluded from the assessment, so the average runs over the remaining nine dimensions.

Without a state of its own

A descriptive case, outside the ranking and without a numerical score. This part enters neither of the readings nor the extremes of the series.

· The Polish lands and Polish organisations facing the war

State of preparations as of 27 July 1914 · card concept, dossier in preparation

What people, resources and room for action did Polish organisations have on the eve of the war?

Why no numerical score? In 1914 the Polish lands lay within three partitioning states (Russian, German and Austro-Hungarian), and Polish organisations operated under three separate legal orders. There is no single state and no common command, so the card receives neither a with-allies nor a without-allies reading.

The three partitions side by side · as of 27 July 1914

The two Galician unions stand separately: their strengths come from separate studies, and no study gives a sum.

Austrian partition · Austria-Hungary
military formations: legal, arms with the army's consent [HC-1914-001, HC-1914-019, HC-1914-003]
Związek Strzelecki (Riflemen’s Association): 6.4–8 thousand [HC-1914-001, HC-1914-019]
Polskie Drużyny Strzeleckie (Polish Riflemen’s Squads): c. 6 thousand (one source) [HC-1914-003]
Sokół permanent squads: c. 6.9 thousand (one source) [HC-1914-005]
Austria-Hungary: service in the land forces: 3 years (one source) [HC-1914-003]
legal frame: autonomy, provincial Diet [HC-1914-002, HC-1914-014]
Russian partition · Russia
military formations: underground only [HC-1914-003, HC-1914-018, HC-1914-012]
members of riflemen's formations, summer 1914: no figure · ZWC and PDS cells underground; for conspiratorial reasons not even estimates survive (no. 3). [HC-1914-003, HC-1914-018]
legal frame: Russification, state of reinforced protection [HC-1914-002, HC-1914-004]
Prussian partition · Germany
military formations: no legal formations [HC-1914-008, HC-1914-021, HC-1914-006]
Sokół in the Reich, members (1913): c. 11.8 thousand (one source) [HC-1914-008]
legal frame: Germanisation, police supervision [HC-1914-002, HC-1914-006, HC-1914-008]

Poles under arms in the three partitioning armies before the war: 250–300 thousand (one compilation) [HC-1914-024]

Two orientations, one nation in three armies

Dmowski, 1908: With Russia against Germany. National Democracy saw Germany as the main threat and counted on autonomy for the Kingdom under the Russian sceptre. [HC-1914-010, HC-1914-011, HC-1914-002]

Piłsudski, Paris lecture, 21 February 1914: With Austria against Russia. The independence camp built riflemen's organisations in Galicia and saw Austria as an ally against Russia. [HC-1914-012, HC-1914-013, HC-1914-002]

“The tragedy of its destiny, condemning it to a sizeable enlargement of the military ranks of the three partitioners, may also set its sons against one another in hostile ranks.” (Józef Piłsudski on the Polish nation, lecture at the Geographical Society in Paris, 21 February 1914 (English rendering of the Polish translation of the French report) [HC-1914-012])

Guiding questions

  1. Who could act? (Organisations · leaderships · aims) Each organisation is described on its own: where it operated, who led it and how much freedom of decision it had.
  2. Whose were the resources? (Cadres · arms · money) For every resource we ask who held it, who had access to it and who decided on its use, because a soldier's origin or a depot's location does not settle who could dispose of them.
  3. On whom did the decision depend? (Consents · patronage · constraints) Who provided support, on what terms, and who could withdraw it?

The three partitions side by side · as of 27 July 1914

Cells with text in italics are explicit evidence gaps: no two independent sources, or a finding that is an inference rather than a citation. The bracketed references point to the source list below.

Preparations up to 27 July 1914 in the three partitions
questionAustrian partitionRussian partitionPrussian partition
Legal frameworkFrom the 1860s Galicia had autonomy, with a provincial Diet in Lwów and an administration in Polish hands, and the right to form parties and associations under the Austrian law of 15 November 1867. Statutes were approved by the Governor's Office in Lwów. [HC-1914-002, HC-1914-005, HC-1914-014, HC-1914-001, HC-1914-013]In the Kingdom of Poland Russification continued and Polish was excluded from the public sphere. After the 1905 revolution the country lived under martial law, replaced in 1908–1909 by a yearly renewed state of reinforced protection (martial law lasted in the Piotrków governorate until 1914). Associations could be legalised from 1906 by governorate boards. [HC-1914-002, HC-1914-004, HC-1914-009]Germanisation removed Polish from administration, courts and schools, and the Reich associations law of 19 April 1908 (§ 12) required public meetings to be held in German, with narrow exceptions. Polish societies were legal but under constant police supervision, which fined them for uniforms, badges and songs. [HC-1914-002, HC-1914-006, HC-1914-007, HC-1914-008]
Military and paramilitary organisationsOperating legally were the Związek Strzelecki and “Strzelec” (from 1910, run by the secret Związek Walki Czynnej; about 6.4–8 thousand members), the Polskie Drużyny Strzeleckie (from 1911; about 6 thousand in the summer of 1914), the Sokół permanent squads and the Drużyny Bartoszowe (from 1908). The army supplied instructors and rifle ranges; the police kept watch and confiscated arms in 1913. [HC-1914-019, HC-1914-001, HC-1914-003, HC-1914-005, HC-1914-012]There were no legal formations. Cells of the Związek Walki Czynnej and of the Polskie Drużyny Strzeleckie (the PDS “foreign” districts) worked underground, as did the Organizacje Wojskowe im. Waleriana Łukasińskiego, founded in 1910. For conspiratorial reasons, not even estimates of their strength survive.Evidence gap: for the strength of the ZWC and PDS cells in the Kingdom not even estimates survive, so the card gives no figure at all. [HC-1914-003, HC-1914-018, HC-1914-001, HC-1914-012]Sokół operated legally as a gymnastic society, regarded by the authorities as hostile since 1903; drills with arms were run on their own initiative by individual nests (Poznań, Buk, Bydgoszcz, the Berlin district in 1913). In 1912–1914 a few clandestine Polskie Drużyny Strzeleckie arose among secondary-school youth.Evidence gap: the absence of legal paramilitary formations is an inference from the legal framework [6] and from the literature on Sokół [8, 21], which describe only attempts to militarise individual nests; none of these sources states the absence outright. The strength of Sokół and of the clandestine squads rests on a single source each, so the card does not give it. [HC-1914-008, HC-1914-021, HC-1914-006]
Political camps and orientationsThe Austro-Polish orientation: the conservatives and the Polish Circle in the Reichsrat (chaired by Juliusz Leo) combined loyalty to the monarchy with extending Galicia's rights. From October 1912 the independence camp gathered in the Provisional Commission of Confederated Independence Parties (the riflemen's associations and, formally, the PDS); Sokół and the Drużyny Bartoszowe stood under National Democratic influence, outside the Commission. [HC-1914-002, HC-1914-001, HC-1914-005, HC-1914-014, HC-1914-015, HC-1914-016]Roman Dmowski's National Democracy (“Niemcy, Rosya i kwestya polska”, 1908) saw Germany as the main source of danger and sought an understanding with Russia, counting on autonomy for the Kingdom; its deputies formed the Polish caucus in the Duma. The independence camp that grew out of the PPS founded its secret military organisations (the Związek Walki Czynnej) from 1908 in Galicia, not in the Kingdom. [HC-1914-010, HC-1914-011, HC-1914-002, HC-1914-017, HC-1914-001]Polish politics stayed within legal resistance: the deputies of the Polish Circle in the Reichstag and the Prussian Landtag, and Sokół, whose ideological profile was shaped by National League members. There was no pro-German orientation; before the war Germany was regarded as the main enemy.Evidence gap: no peer-reviewed study of the Polish Circle's position in the Reichstag in 1912–1914 was found; item no. 8 mentions it only in passing. [HC-1914-008, HC-1914-002, HC-1914-006]
Conscription into three armiesPoles from Galicia were subject to universal service in the Austro-Hungarian army (3 years in the land forces). Before the war the independence camp said publicly that a war would set Poles from the three armies against one another (Piłsudski's Paris lecture, 21 February 1914). [HC-1914-003, HC-1914-012, HC-1914-013, HC-1914-024]Poles from the Kingdom were conscripted into the Russian army. National Democracy assumed that in a war with Germany Poles should side with Russia, which after victory would unite the Polish lands and grant them autonomy. [HC-1914-024, HC-1914-002, HC-1914-010, HC-1914-011]Poles from the Prussian partition were conscripted into the German army. The Sokół leadership kept to legal resistance; attempts to militarise the nests were few and lacked the authorities' consent. [HC-1914-008, HC-1914-021, HC-1914-024]
Who decided on people and armsThe riflemen answered to the Chief Command (Józef Piłsudski, chief of staff Kazimierz Sosnkowski) under the Provisional Commission; the PDS, the Sokół squads and the Drużyny Bartoszowe had their own leaderships, and the first joint conference (8 July 1914) produced no common command. Any use depended on the Austrian authorities: on statutes, arms and rifle ranges. [HC-1914-001, HC-1914-003, HC-1914-005, HC-1914-019]No one legally. The underground cells had no lawful room for action under the state of reinforced protection, and decisions about them rested with leaderships in Galicia (the Związek Walki Czynnej and the Provisional Commission, the PDS Chief Command). [HC-1914-004, HC-1914-003, HC-1914-018]No one legally. The board of the Union of Polish Sokół in the Reich controlled only the structure of a gymnastic society and kept to legal resistance; drills with arms depended on the initiative of individual nests, without the authorities' consent. [HC-1914-008, HC-1914-021]

What the war changed: 1914–1918 (the ex post part)

Later events do not raise the assessment of the July preparations and rest on a separate evidential basis.

  • · end of the account
  • · The Cadre Company The unit is formed in Kraków. This is already the state after the adopted cutoff of the preparations.
  • · The Legions initiative The organisation of Polish formations alongside Austria-Hungary, dependent on the consent of the Austrian authorities.
  • · New institutions The Polish National Committee in Paris and the Regency Council: further, separate centres of action.
  • · The rebuilding of the state The end point of this story. The outcome was not known to those organising the preparations in July 1914.
  • · Scale of mobilisation Estimates of Poles mobilised into the three partitioning armies range from “over 3 million” (no. 17) to 3.4 million (no. 20) (1.4 million Austria-Hungary, 1.2 million Russia, 0.8 million Germany). In the Prussian partition nearly half of Sokół's members were in the army at the very start of the war. Some of those mobilised fought against each other. [HC-1914-002, HC-1914-017, HC-1914-020, HC-1914-008]

1914–1918: 3–3.4 million Poles in three armies (Austrian 1.4 million, Russian 1.2 million, German 800 thousand) [HC-1914-002, HC-1914-017, HC-1914-020]

Evidence for the card

The bracketed references above point to the entries of this list; the same list stands in the project's source register.

  1. HC-1914-001 · Mateusz Drozdowski: Polish Paramilitary Organisations before 1914 (v. 1.0) · 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War (Freie Universität Berlin) · T2 · dead link, archive
  2. HC-1914-002 · Piotr Szlanta: Poland (handbook article, v. 1.0) · 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War (Freie Universität Berlin) · T2 · dead link, archive
  3. HC-1914-003 · Waldemar Potkański: Polski ruch paramilitarny na terenie Galicji przed wybuchem wielkiej wojny w roku 1914 [Waldemar Potkański: The Polish paramilitary movement in Galicia before the outbreak of the Great War in 1914] · Kwartalnik Historyczny, vol. CXVI (2009), no. 2, pp. 175–196 (IH PAN; scan in RCIN) · T2
  4. HC-1914-004 · Stanisław Wiech: Stan wojenny w Królestwie Polskim (1861–1905) [Stanisław Wiech: Martial law in the Kingdom of Poland (1861–1905)] · Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, vol. LVIII (2023), no. 1 (IH PAN; scan in RCIN) · T2
  5. HC-1914-005 · Jan Snopko: Polskie Towarzystwo Gimnastyczne „Sokół” w Galicji 1867–1914, Białystok 1997 [Jan Snopko: The Polish 'Sokół' Gymnastic Society in Galicia 1867–1914, Białystok 1997] · Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku (monograph; scan in Repozytorium UwB) · T2
  6. HC-1914-006 · Staatliche Maßnahmen gegenüber der polnischen Minderheit und den Bevölkerungen in den überseeischen Gebieten des Deutschen Reichs 1871 bis 1918 [State measures towards the Polish minority and the populations of the overseas territories of the German Reich, 1871 to 1918] · Wissenschaftliche Dienste des Deutschen Bundestages (Dokumentation WD 1 - 3000 - 040/18) · T2
  7. HC-1914-007 · Vereinsgesetz vom 19. April 1908, § 12 [Associations Act of 19 April 1908, § 12] · Deutsches Reichsgesetzblatt 1908, Nr. 18, S. 151–157 (Wikisource transcription with the scan from Commons) · T1
  8. HC-1914-008 · Janusz Karwat: Towarzystwo Gimnastyczne „Sokół” zaboru pruskiego w dążeniu do niepodległości [Janusz Karwat: The 'Sokół' Gymnastic Society of the Prussian partition in its striving for independence] · Dzieje Najnowsze, vol. XXVI (1994), no. 4, pp. 5–21 (IH PAN; scan in RCIN) · T2
  9. HC-1914-009 · Wojciech Jaworski: Towarzystwa śpiewacze w Królestwie Polskim (1859–1914) [Wojciech Jaworski: Singing societies in the Kingdom of Poland (1859–1914)] · Studia Historyczne, vol. LVII (2014), no. 1 (225), pp. 45–66 (PAN Oddział w Krakowie) · T2
  10. HC-1914-010 · Roman Dmowski: Niemcy, Rosya i kwestya polska, Lwów 1908 [Roman Dmowski: Germany, Russia and the Polish Question, Lwów 1908] · Nakładem Towarzystwa Wydawniczego, Lwów (H. Altenberg) [published by the Towarzystwo Wydawnicze]; Google/Internet Archive scan · T1
  11. HC-1914-011 · Michał Leśniewski: Dmowski, Roman (v. 1.0) · 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War (Freie Universität Berlin) · T2 · dead link, archive
  12. HC-1914-012 · Józef Piłsudski: O polskim ruchu strzeleckim (odczyt w Towarzystwie Geograficznym w Paryżu, 21 II 1914; sprawozdanie z „Bulletin polonais” 15 IV 1914) [Józef Piłsudski: On the Polish rifle movement (lecture at the Geographical Society in Paris, 21 February 1914; report in the 'Bulletin polonais' of 15 April 1914)] · Józef Piłsudski, Pisma zbiorowe, vol. III, Instytut Józefa Piłsudskiego, Warszawa 1937, pp. 250–253 (scan of the 1937 edition at pilsudski-pisma.online) · T1
  13. HC-1914-013 · Jerzy Gaul: Trzymajcie się z Zachodem... Józef Piłsudski w poszukiwaniu polskiej racji stanu [Jerzy Gaul: Hold with the West... Józef Piłsudski in search of a Polish raison d'état] · Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Warszawa 2023 (monograph) · T2
  14. HC-1914-014 · Damian Szymczak: Zmierzch galicyjskiego austrofilizmu i idei austro-polskiej. Michał Bobrzyński jako minister dla Galicji i kwestia wyodrębnienia Galicji (1916–1917) [Damian Szymczak: The twilight of Galician Austrophilism and of the Austro-Polish idea. Michał Bobrzyński as Minister for Galicia and the question of separating Galicia (1916–1917)] · Galicja. Studia i materiały, no. 1 (2015), Instytut Historii Uniwersytetu Rzeszowskiego, ISSN 2450-5854, p. 21 ff. · T2
  15. HC-1914-015 · Stanisław Pijaj: Archiwum Koła Polskiego w parlamencie wiedeńskim (losy i stan zachowania materiałów) [Stanisław Pijaj: The archive of the Polish Circle in the Viennese parliament (the fate and state of preservation of the materials)] · Studia Podlaskie, vol. 32 (2024), Uniwersytet w Białymstoku · T2
  16. HC-1914-016 · Anna Czocher: Małopolscy Bohaterowie Niepodległości. Juliusz Leo (1861–1918). Przez Austrię do Polski [Anna Czocher: Lesser Poland Heroes of Independence. Juliusz Leo (1861–1918). Through Austria to Poland] · Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Oddział w Krakowie · T3
  17. HC-1914-017 · Mirosław Szumiło: Polacy w walce o niepodległość 1914-1918 [Mirosław Szumiło: Poles in the struggle for independence 1914-1918] · IPN Przystanek Historia · T3
  18. HC-1914-018 · Mariusz Jarosiński: Polska Organizacja Wojskowa [Mariusz Jarosiński: The Polish Military Organisation] · dzieje.pl (PAP / Muzeum Historii Polski) · T3
  19. HC-1914-019 · Anna Kruszyńska: 110 lat temu powołano Związek Strzelecki [Anna Kruszyńska: 110 years ago the Riflemen's Association was founded] · dzieje.pl (PAP / Muzeum Historii Polski) · T3
  20. HC-1914-020 · Mariusz Jarosiński: 500 tys. Polaków straciło życie w armiach zaborczych w I wojnie światowej [Mariusz Jarosiński: 500,000 Poles lost their lives in the armies of the partitioning powers in the First World War] · dzieje.pl (PAP / Muzeum Historii Polski) · T3
  21. HC-1914-021 · Andrzej Bogucki: Towarzystwo Gimnastyczne „Sokół” w Bydgoszczy 1886-2016 [Andrzej Bogucki: The 'Sokół' Gymnastic Society in Bydgoszcz 1886-2016] · Kujawsko-Pomorska Szkoła Wyższa w Bydgoszczy, „Miscellanea”, vol. VIII, no. 1 · T3
  22. HC-1914-022 · kalendarium [timeline] · Muzeum Historii Polski · T3
  23. HC-1914-023 · wystawa o Legionach Polskich [exhibition on the Polish Legions] · Archiwum Państwowe w Łodzi · T3 · dead link, archive
  24. HC-1914-024 · Mariusz Jarosiński: 500 tys. Polaków straciło życie w armiach zaborczych w I wojnie światowej [Mariusz Jarosiński: 500,000 Poles lost their lives in the armies of the partitioning powers in the First World War] · dzieje.pl (PAP / Muzeum Historii Polski) · T3

Method. The case is described separately, and dependence on a great power is not converted into an alliance premium. The absence of a comparable score does not mean zero capacity to act. The cross-section of the preparations (up to 27 July 1914) and the later events rest on separate evidential bases; every number on the card carries a reference to the source list, and a single-source number is marked as such.

Rhymes of history

* 1920: no physically present combat ally (the advisory French Military Mission, about 600 officers; the Franco-Polish alliance came only in 1921), and the alliance dimension is among the lowest in the series here. * 2026: an open column with no outcome, so it stands there as an instance of the mechanism, not its confirmation.

Two sources for the contemporary assessment

The NIK audit covers civil protection. Defence24 reports Ministry of National Defence figures on active personnel. These sources contribute to two dimensions of the assessment.

Open the source material

2026 · Civil protection

Knowledge as of 2026-08-29

NIK report 'W schronie się nie schronisz' (March 2024): according to the PSP inventory, population coverage by places in protective structures is below 4% (approx. 1.43 million places), 1903 shelters and 8719 hideouts; 68% of the inspected shelters did not meet the required technical conditions, and NIK identified the main cause as the years-long absence of basic regulations on the management of protective structures. NIK found the PSP inventory data unreliable.

Quotation in its original language

Dwa lata po wybuchu wojny w Ukrainie, w Polsce na miejsce w schronach i ukryciach może liczyć niecałe 4% mieszkańców [...] Wśród nich znalazło się 1903 schronów i 8719 ukryć. [...] zaledwie 3 schrony i 2 ukrycia były w bardzo dobrym stanie technicznym.
Source: W schronie się nie schronisz [You won't find shelter in a shelter] · Najwyższa Izba Kontroli · 2024-03

2026 · Active personnel

Knowledge as of 2026-08-29

Defence24 (24 July 2026, Jarosław Ciślak) publishes fresh MON data as of 30 June 2026. The total strength of the armed forces is about 220k soldiers, including ~40k in TSW and a total of ~17.9k in DZSW, and the professional corps has grown by 42% since the end of 2020. This is active strength, not a trained mobilisation reserve.

Quotation in its original language

Pod koniec czerwca 2026 roku w Wojsku Polskim służyło: około 156 tys. żołnierzy zawodowych; około 5,6 tys. żołnierzy zawodowych w okresie kształcenia (czyli na drugim i kolejnych latach akademii wojskowych); około 3,3 tys. żołnierzy dobrowolnej zasadniczej służby wojskowej w okresie kształcenia (czyli w pierwszym jego roku); około 14,6 tys. żołnierzy dobrowolnej zasadniczej służby wojskowej; około 40 tys. żołnierzy terytorialnej służby wojskowej.
Source: Mamy najnowsze dane. Tylu żołnierzy ma Polska [NEWS DEFENCE24] [We have the latest data. This is how many soldiers Poland has (DEFENCE24 NEWS)] · Defence24 · 2026-07-24

Two examples behind the comparison

The historical source concerns mobilisation; the contemporary source concerns active personnel. These figures cover different groups. The index assesses each era against its own threat.

Open the source material

1939 · Mobilisation

Knowledge as of 1939-08-31

Ministry of National Defence portal "Polska Zbrojna" quotes Brig. Gen. Jan Rydz of the General Staff: reserve resources then stood at about 4 million; by the end of August about 950k of the planned ~1.3 million were deployed.

Quotation in its original language

Wtedy od marca do końca sierpnia udało się zmobilizować 950 tys. z planowanych 1 mln 300 tys. osób (ówczesne zasoby wynosiły 4 mln żołnierzy rezerwy).
Source: Wojny wygrywa rezerwa [Wars are won by the reserve] · Polska Zbrojna (Wojskowy Instytut Wydawniczy) · 2019-11-05 Publication after the assessment cutoff (ex post).

2026 · Active personnel

Knowledge as of 2026-08-29

Defence24 (24 July 2026, Jarosław Ciślak) publishes fresh MON data as of 30 June 2026. The total strength of the armed forces is about 220k soldiers, including ~40k in TSW and a total of ~17.9k in DZSW, and the professional corps has grown by 42% since the end of 2020. This is active strength, not a trained mobilisation reserve.

Quotation in its original language

Pod koniec czerwca 2026 roku w Wojsku Polskim służyło: około 156 tys. żołnierzy zawodowych; około 5,6 tys. żołnierzy zawodowych w okresie kształcenia (czyli na drugim i kolejnych latach akademii wojskowych); około 3,3 tys. żołnierzy dobrowolnej zasadniczej służby wojskowej w okresie kształcenia (czyli w pierwszym jego roku); około 14,6 tys. żołnierzy dobrowolnej zasadniczej służby wojskowej; około 40 tys. żołnierzy terytorialnej służby wojskowej.
Source: Mamy najnowsze dane. Tylu żołnierzy ma Polska [NEWS DEFENCE24] [We have the latest data. This is how many soldiers Poland has (DEFENCE24 NEWS)] · Defence24 · 2026-07-24

Sources for two of the cases

An alliance treaty and an audit of protective structures show the basis for two cases discussed here. The era cards provide further evidence and counter-evidence.

Open the source material

1683 · Alliance commitment

Knowledge as of 1683-08-14

An article by the historian Natalia Królikowska-Jedlińska (Muzeum Pałacu w Wilanowie) on the Treaty of Warsaw 1683: the negotiations were conducted by the resident Zierowsky and the extraordinary envoy Waldstein with the support of the nuncio Pallavicino; the treaty was agreed at the Sejm on 31 March, signed on 1 April (antedated), ratified in May. The terms: 60,000 imperial troops, 40,000 Polish, mutual relief of Vienna/Kraków, financial subsidies, Leopold I's renunciation of claims to the Polish crown.

Quotation in its original language

Traktat regulował wielkość armii cesarskiej wystawionej na potrzeby wojny na 60 000, a polskiej na 40 000.
Source: Traktat warszawski z 1683 roku [The Treaty of Warsaw of 1683] · Muzeum Pałacu Króla Jana III w Wilanowie · 2016-10-11 Publication after the assessment cutoff (ex post).

2026 · Civil protection

Knowledge as of 2026-08-29

NIK report 'W schronie się nie schronisz' (March 2024): according to the PSP inventory, population coverage by places in protective structures is below 4% (approx. 1.43 million places), 1903 shelters and 8719 hideouts; 68% of the inspected shelters did not meet the required technical conditions, and NIK identified the main cause as the years-long absence of basic regulations on the management of protective structures. NIK found the PSP inventory data unreliable.

Quotation in its original language

Dwa lata po wybuchu wojny w Ukrainie, w Polsce na miejsce w schronach i ukryciach może liczyć niecałe 4% mieszkańców [...] Wśród nich znalazło się 1903 schronów i 8719 ukryć. [...] zaledwie 3 schrony i 2 ukrycia były w bardzo dobrym stanie technicznym.
Source: W schronie się nie schronisz [You won't find shelter in a shelter] · Najwyższa Izba Kontroli · 2024-03

Sources for the crisis cards

Two sources cover NATO deployments and civil protection. Each concerns a different dimension used in the corresponding crisis card.

Open the source material

2022 · NATO forward presence

Knowledge as of 2022-02-24

NATO's February 2022 Enhanced Forward Presence factsheet: the US-led battlegroup operated with Polish forces at Orzysz (Bemowo Piskie), totalling about 1,058 personnel. The US contributed 797 (a mechanised infantry battalion with support), the UK 137 (a light reconnaissance squadron), Romania up to 120 (an air defence battery) and Croatia 4 (battlegroup headquarters). Editorial assessment: on the eve of the invasion, the group in Poland was battalion-sized, about a thousand personnel from four states; NATO itself notes that figures are approximate.

Quotation in its original language

Battlegroup led by the United States, operating with Polish forces in Orzysz (Bemowo Piskie), Poland Contributor Troops Forces United States 797 [...] 1 x Mechanized Infantry Battalion with Combat Support and Combat Service Support enablers. Croatia 4 [...] 1 x Contribution to battlegroup headquarters Romania up to 120 [...] 1 x Self-propelled defence battery and support elements United Kingdom 137 [...] Light reconnaissance squadron [...] Logistics support element Approximate total troop number: 1058
Source: NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence (Factsheet, February 2022) · NATO Public Diplomacy Division · 2022-02-01

2025 · Civil protection

Knowledge as of 2025-09-10

According to the Supreme Audit Office (NIK, 13 March 2024), just under 4% of residents have a place in shelters and hiding places (data from a State Fire Service report, which NIK judged unreliable). The fire service inventoried 1,903 shelters and 8,719 hiding places. Among the facilities NIK inspected, only 3 shelters and 2 hiding places were in very good technical condition, while most of the shelters (17) and more than half of the hiding places (10) did not meet the required technical conditions.

Quotation in its original language

Dwa lata po wybuchu wojny w Ukrainie, w Polsce na miejsce w schronach i ukryciach może liczyć niecałe 4% mieszkańców (raport Państwowej Straży Pożarnej) [...] NIK wykazała również, że przedstawione w raporcie dane są nierzetelne. [...] Wśród nich znalazło się 1903 schronów i 8719 ukryć. [...] zaledwie 3 schrony i 2 ukrycia były w bardzo dobrym stanie technicznym. Wymaganych warunków technicznych nie spełniało natomiast większość schronów - 17 i ponad połowa ukryć - 10.
Source: W schronie się nie schronisz — informacja o wynikach kontroli budowli ochronnych [You won't take shelter in a shelter: information on the results of the audit of protective structures] · Najwyższa Izba Kontroli · 2024-03

Sources for the scenario schedules

The sources describe expected deliveries. The scenarios test conditional effects of delivery and delay.

Open the source material

2030 · Helicopter delivery announcement

Knowledge as of 2026-08-29

Boeing announced 96 AH-64E Apache helicopters for Poland. Deliveries are expected to begin in 2028.

Quotation in its original language

96 AH-64E Apache helicopters for the Polish Armed Forces [...] Deliveries are expected to begin in 2028
Source: Boeing to Build 96 AH-64E Apache Helicopters for Poland · Boeing (media room) · 2025-11-26

2030 · Tank delivery plan

Knowledge as of 2026-08-29

The article describes expected K2GF deliveries in 2026–2027 and K2PL deliveries in 2028–2030.

Quotation in its original language

Przewiduje się, że dostawy czołgów K2GF odbędą się w latach 2026-2027, zmodernizowanej wersji K2PL – w latach 2028-2030
Source: Czołgi K2PL powstaną w Bumarze. Kluczowa umowa podpisana [K2PL tanks will be built at Bumar. Key agreement signed] · Defence24 · 2025-10-28

Methodology

What we measure
The index assesses Poland's defensive readiness at a given moment, relative to the threat of the era and not in a vacuum. It is not a forecast of whether war will break out or whether the defence would succeed.
Scale 0–10 (relative)
Assessment relative to the state of the military art of the era: 0–2 defencelessness · 3–4 functions with bottlenecks · 5–6 solid with gaps · 7–8 high readiness · 9–10 aggression becomes irrational. 10 is a model, no one in the series attains it.
What the uncertainty band means
The band on a score is a judgement about how strong the evidence behind it is. It is not a confidence interval, since no significance level or probability distribution stands behind it. The scale of bands is the same in every era column: ±0.5 where the evidence is strong and concordant, ±1.0 in the typical case, ±1.5 to ±2.0 where the base is thin or divergent, with intermediate values where the material calls for them. The band on the composite index of an era column is the root mean square of the dimension bands, rounded up to a multiple of 0.25. Crises without war carry a separately estimated band. We do not tell two readings apart when the gap between them is smaller than the narrower of their two bands. At bands of this width, a difference of tenths of a point is not a difference.
Two measures
“With allies” counts real allied support (today NATO), “without allies” counts own forces only. The with-allies profile is not always the without-allies profile plus the allied dimension score, because an alliance can change what forces, logistics and command are worth. In 8 of the 10 columns it changes something besides the allied dimension, and in the 2026 column as many as 6 dimensions, though in some columns only one dimension score differs. The difference can be negative, because the reading with allies adds a dimension that does not exist without them, allied deterrence, and that one can score below the rest of the defence. What counts is real presence, not guarantees on paper.
Historical scores: only what was known at the time
Historical columns are scored solely on what decision-makers could have known on the cutoff date, without hindsight. The validator enforces this rule at the level of the evidence.
10 dimensions
Forces & command · Equipment · Reserves · Logistics · Allies · Strategic shield · Civil protection · Infrastructure · Economy · Intelligence & cyber. The main result is the profile. The aggregate index is secondary and carries an uncertainty band and a sensitivity test on the weights.
How ten scores become one number
The composite index is a weighted mean of the dimension scores, computed with three weight sets at once. The published number is the plain mean of those three results, and the spread between them is the sensitivity test on the weights. For the 2026 column it comes to 0.20 of a point at a reading of 4.96 with allies, and 0.11 of a point at 4.40 without. In the standalone reading the allied dimension is not scored, and the weights of the remaining nine are rescaled so that they again add up to one hundred per cent. The full sets, each adding up to one hundred per cent: equal weights: Forces & command 10%, Equipment 10%, Reserves 10%, Logistics 10%, Allies 10%, Strategic shield 10%, Civil protection 10%, Infrastructure 10%, Economy 10%, Intelligence & cyber 10%; combat-capability emphasis: Forces & command 15%, Equipment 15%, Reserves 10%, Logistics 15%, Allies 10%, Strategic shield 8%, Civil protection 5%, Infrastructure 10%, Economy 7%, Intelligence & cyber 5%; resilience emphasis: Forces & command 7%, Equipment 7%, Reserves 10%, Logistics 12%, Allies 8%, Strategic shield 7%, Civil protection 17%, Infrastructure 12%, Economy 10%, Intelligence & cyber 10%.
Cost and consequences – after the fact
The human cost and long-term consequences are described after the fact, in a separate layer. They never feed the readiness score, sort it or weight it. This is a layer of memory, not a measure.
Sources and counter-evidence
Every piece of evidence has a citation, a date and a reliability tier (from T1, official sources, to T4, the rest). Each dimension must also carry evidence that contradicts the score, because a set of evidence without it does not pass the check. Links are checked, and for dead ones we give an archive. The base is predominantly Polish-language: 688 of 902 registry entries, against 192 in English. The remaining 22 are German (11), French (4), Dutch (2), Russian (2), Swedish (2) and Latin (1). A reader without Polish can therefore check the figure and the path to the source, but usually not the source itself.
Adversarial review (red team)
Three independent adversarial passes, run by a model rather than by people, were told to overturn the scores, not to confirm them. They hunted for scores placed badly on the scale, missed counter-evidence, breaches of the rule to score only on what was known at the cutoff date, and bands set too narrow. The record covers 28 of the 110 dimensions of the whole scoring corpus, spread across 11 columns, and reaches 10 of them; the only column with no entry is 1792. There are 39 entries. On this page, 22 of the 28 dimensions with an entry can be opened. The difference is what the page does not show as a separate column: 1939B, the scenario variant of 1939. Of the entries, 34 record a recalibration of a score, a band or a score cap, 7 record a challenge considered and rejected with reasons, and 2 belong to both groups at once: the central value was defended and the band widened instead. The text of the challenges on the dimensions this page opens is in the components drawer. The rest of the record sits in the reviewer's working shorthand next to each dimension in the scoring layer, with a summary of some columns in the review log red-team-log.md. The repository is private, so that part cannot be checked without access to it.
Crises without war are scored differently
Crises without war carry a lighter set of evidence than the era columns, and a rough combined score instead of the full procedure. They are a directional signal, not a measurement on the same scale. A crisis reading (2025: 6.20 with allies) can sit above every era column (the peak of the series is 1683: 5.15), which does not mean readiness was greater that year. A crisis measures resilience against one event below the threshold of war, an era column measures readiness against full-scale war. The two sets of numbers should not be placed side by side.
Years without a threat have no score
We always measure readiness against a specific threat, so a year without one has no number on this scale. Two such years still show what the era columns cannot, namely that an army's capability and the nature of its alliance have to be judged separately. In 1988 the Polish People's Army had 400–440 thousand soldiers, but the alliance was imposed. Moscow used the Warsaw Pact to control Poland, and it assigned the Polish army an offensive towards Denmark and northern West Germany rather than the defence of the country. In 1999 it was the other way round: an army after deep cuts, with ageing Soviet-era equipment and poor compatibility with NATO, but in an alliance of choice rather than an imposed one, as Poland joined the North Atlantic Alliance on 12 March. A large army in an imposed alliance and a weak army in a chosen one are two different states that a single number could not capture, which is why both years serve here as an example and are not cards in the series.
Limitations
The index measures the development of the state apparatus in the scored dimensions. It does not measure survival against an overwhelming advantage of scale, because that belongs to the unscored threat context. This is why it cannot tell the reading of the lost year 1831 apart from that of the victorious 1920. Nor do the ten dimensions score separately several functions on which a state's ability to operate under strain depends. These are people's psychological resilience, the continuity of basic services (water, food, medical care, payments) and dependence on space services such as satellite navigation and communications. They appear in the evidence of broader dimensions, but none has a score of its own, and in the 2026 column health care currently has no evidence admitted to scoring. A high dimension score therefore does not settle whether these functions would hold up in a war.

Sources

Based on 902 source-registry entries and 1675 evidence items of the scored index plus 24 evidence items of the descriptive cards (tiers: T1 112 official · T2 264 research · T3 454 journalism · T4 72), with mandatory counter-evidence. Links checked: 878/902 live. The base is predominantly Polish-language: 688 of 902 registry entries, against 192 in English. The repository is private, so the address is given for the record: https://github.com/kgluszczyk/worrier.

About the project

We develop this index with AI assistance. Methodology and sources

The index grew out of the author's private attempt to bring order to his own anxiety about what war would mean for him and his family in Poland. Instead of fear alone, the aim was a measure, with context and history. The index was made together with an advanced AI (Fable 5). Source research, dimension scoring and the texts came out of a dialogue between a person and the model, under human oversight. Hard rules of honesty apply. Historical scores rest only on what was known at each era's cutoff, the human cost never feeds into a readiness score, every dimension carries mandatory counter-evidence, and the scores are subject to red-team review.

State of knowledge: the “today” column (2026) and the projections are frozen as of 29 August 2026. Historical columns are scored solely on the basis of what was knowable on that era's cutoff date.

For all who had to stand ready.

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Frequently asked questions

How ready is Poland in 2026?
The Defence Readiness Index (PWRI) puts Poland's readiness in 2026 at 4.40/10 without allies and 4.96/10 with alliances (NATO), relative to the threat and demands of the era. On the with-allies reading 1683 (5.15) still sits higher, though the gap falls inside the uncertainty bands. Three eras stand high on both readings at once: 1410, 1683 and 2026. What sets today apart among them is the alliance dimension: the Article 5 collective-defence commitment, permanently stationed troops, prepositioned equipment and joint plans. Allied troops had stood on Polish soil before, from the Tatar auxiliaries of 1655 to the French Military Mission of 1920, but on an incomparably smaller scale and in a looser form. The present-day bottleneck is civil protection. How the two measures are computed
Is Poland's 2026 readiness unprecedented?
Without allies, no. Standing on its own (4.40), 2026 does not stand out from the strongest historical reference points: 1410 (4.75) and 1683 (4.69) score higher, but the index cannot tell any of those scores apart from today's. By the same rule 6 of the 9 other columns are indistinguishable from it, 1831 (4.32) among them. Three eras stand high on both readings at once: 1410, 1683 and 2026. What sets today apart among them is the alliance dimension (the Article 5 collective-defence commitment with troops stationed, equipment prepositioned and joint plans). The combined score alone, which stands at 4.96 with allies, does not set it apart. Where the band comes from
What does 'readiness ≠ survival' mean?
Higher readiness does not guarantee victory. The standalone readings for the lost war of 1831 (4.32) and the won war of 1920 (3.96) differ by 0.36 of a point, less than the uncertainty band on either of them (1.50 and 1.50). The index therefore cannot tell the two eras apart, although one lost and the other won. Alliances, scale and chance decided the outcome, not the numbers alone. The index measures preparation and does not predict the course or outcome of a war. Where the band comes from
Is this a forecast of war?
No. The index does not predict whether war will break out or whether a defence would succeed. It measures defensive readiness at a given moment, relative to the threat of the era. That makes it a conditional analysis, not a probability forecast of aggression.
What sources is the index based on?
On 902 source-registry entries and 1675 evidence items, which fall into four reliability tiers, from T1 (official) to T4 (other). Every dimension carries mandatory evidence that contradicts the score, and an adversarial review (red team) tried to overturn the scores. Historical columns rest only on what could be known on that era's cutoff date; later studies are used only to reconstruct that state. Source register
How is readiness measured?
Each era is scored on 10 dimensions: Forces & command, Equipment, Reserves, Logistics, Allies, Strategic shield, Civil protection, Infrastructure, Economy, Intelligence & cyber. The scale runs from 0 to 10 relative to the state of the military art of the era, and scores come in two families, with allies and without allies. How to read the scale